Wednesday, April 23, 2014 Issue42   VOLUME 2 ISSUE 32  
TMC Manufacturing and Distribution

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7 Degrees of Blond


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The Boeing 787 Delay Liner Wing Load Test

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Boeing 777 Wing Load Test

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In This Issue
Contact TMC Departments
Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 Series Airplanes
Honeywell International Inc. TPE331-10 and TPE331-11 Series Turboprop Engines
Change
Saab AB, Saab Aerosystems Model SAAB 340A (SAAB/SF340A) and SAAB 340B Airplanes
BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 and Avro 146-RJ Airplanes
No more cuts likely at Airbusí Broughton factory
NTSB Urges Safeguards for Flap Settings on Certain Jetliners
What Old People Do For Fun
Regulators Push for Fixes to Embraer Jets
Xi'an Aircraft International Corporation and Goodrich Corporation signed agreements
The Boeing 787 Delay Liner Wing Load Test
Boeing 777 Wing Load Test
7 Degrees of Blond
Will video technology put a permanent dent in business travel?
Pictures You Don't See Every Day
Gauging Boeing's credibility problem
Boeing orders 787 supplier to halt work on two major parts

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Tidbits
Pictures You Don't See Every Day
The World's Weirdest Hotels

Airframe
No more cuts likely at Airbusí Broughton factory
Boss of the aircraft makerís wing factory in north east Wales says he does not envisage any further significant cuts in output from the site.

NTSB Urges Safeguards for Flap Settings on Certain Jetliners
Planes were designed and built by McDonnell Douglas Corp

Regulators Push for Fixes to Embraer Jets
Embraer 170 and 190

Xi'an Aircraft International Corporation and Goodrich Corporation signed agreements
Manufacture landing gear and nacelle components

Electronics
Will video technology put a permanent dent in business travel?
New systems are so reliable that companies have no hesitation to use them

Recent AD's
Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 Series Airplanes
Elevator servo-control disconnection has been experienced

Honeywell International Inc. TPE331-10 and TPE331-11 Series Turboprop Engines
Requires removing certain first stage turbine disks from service

Saab AB, Saab Aerosystems Model SAAB 340A (SAAB/SF340A) and SAAB 340B Airplanes
EASA AD requires the identification of the manufacturing date of the affected placard

BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 and Avro 146-RJ Airplanes
The airbrake upper crossbeam on an airplane failed in-flight

Archive
Issue 41
August 12, 2009
Vol. 2 Issue 31
Issue 40
August 5, 2009
Vol. 2 Issue 30
Issue 39
July 30, 2009
Vol. 2 Issue 29
Issue 38
July 22, 2009
Vol. 2 Issue 28
Issue 37
July 7, 2009
Vol. 2 Issue 27
Issue 36
July 1, 2009
Vol. 2 Issue 26
Issue 35
June 23, 2009
Vol. 2 Issue 25
Issue 34
June 16, 2009
Vol. 2 Issue 24
Issue 33
June 9, 2009
Vol. 2 Issue 23
Issue 32
June 2, 2009
Vol. 2 Issue 22

[MORE]
Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 Series Airplanes
Elevator servo-control disconnection has been experienced
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library...

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

One case of elevator servo-control disconnection has been experienced on an aircraft of the A320 family. Failure occurred at the servo-control rod eye-end. Further to this finding, additional inspections have revealed cracking at the same location on a number of other servo-control rod eye-ends. In one case, both actuators of the same elevator surface were affected. * * *
A dual servo-control disconnection on the same elevator could result in an uncontrolled surface, the elevator surface being neither actuated nor damped, which could lead to reduced control of the aircraft.
* * * * *

We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD becomes effective September 22, 2009.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of September 22, 2009.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov or in person at the U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim Dulin, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-2141; fax (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on January 13, 2009 (74 FR 1646). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

One case of elevator servo-control disconnection has been experienced on an aircraft of the A320 family. Failure occurred at the servo-control rod eye-end. Further to this finding, additional inspections have revealed cracking at the same location on a number of other servo-control rod eye-ends. In one case, both actuators of the same elevator surface were affected. The root cause of the cracking has not yet been determined and tests are ongoing. It is anticipated that further actions will be required.
A dual servo-control disconnection on the same elevator could result in an uncontrolled surface, the elevator surface being neither actuated nor damped, which could lead to reduced control of the aircraft.
For the reason described above, this AD requires a one-time inspection [for cracking] of the elevator servo-control rod eye-ends and, in case of findings, the accomplishment of corrective actions.

The corrective actions include replacing any cracked rod eye-end with a serviceable unit and re-adjusting the elevator servo-control. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

Explanation of Revised Service Information

Airbus has issued All Operators Telex (AOT) A320-27A1186, Revision 04, dated April 3, 2009. (We referred to Airbus AOT A320-27A1186, dated June 23, 2008, in the NPRM as the appropriate source of service information for doing the proposed actions.) Airbus has also issued AOT A320-27A1186, Revision 01, dated August 11, 2008; Revision 02, dated March 30, 2009; and Revision 03, dated April 1, 2009. Airbus issued Revision 01, Revision 03, and Revision 04 of the AOT to include minor improvements in the procedures. No additional work is necessary for airplanes on which Airbus AOT A320-27A1186, dated June 23, 2008; Revision 01, dated August 11, 2008; Revision 02, dated March 30, 2009; or Revision 03, dated April 1, 2009; has been accomplished before the effective date of this AD. We have revised paragraphs (f)(1) through (f)(5), and paragraph (h) of this AD, to include Airbus AOT A320- 27A1186, Revision 04, dated April 3, 2009. We have also added a new paragraph (f)(6) to this AD to include credit for accomplishing the actions before the effective date of this AD using the previously issued AOTs.
Airbus AOT A320-27A1186, Revision 02, dated March 30, 2009, reduces the minimum threshold for inspections from 10,000 to 2,500 flight cycles, based on in service findings. Due to the criticality of the unsafe condition, we have determined that this AD must be issued without further delay; however, after this AD is published we might consider additional rulemaking to address the reduced compliance time.

Comments

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. We considered the comments received.

Request To Revise Work Instructions

Northwest Airlines (NWA) asks that we require Airbus to rewrite the work instructions specified in Airbus AOT A320-27A1186, dated June 23, 2008. NWA states that the work steps are not written in a manner that is easily transferable to work cards, such as would normally be provided with a service bulletin. NWA adds that most of the work steps are provided in multiple references that must be extracted and properly sequenced so that the intent of the AOT can be accomplished.
We acknowledge NWA's concern. We note that Airbus has issued revisions to AOT A320-27A1186 as described above under "Explanation of Revised Service Information.'' However, we disagree that Airbus should revise AOT A320-27A1186 again because we have determined that actions done in accordance with Airbus AOT A320-27A1186, dated June 23, 2008; Revision 01, dated August 11, 2008; Revision 02, dated March 30, 2009; and Revision 03, dated April 1, 2009; or Revision 04, dated April 3, 2009; are adequate to address the identified unsafe condition. Therefore, we have made no change to the AD in this regard.

Request To Remove Reporting Requirement

NWA also asks that the reporting requirement not be included. NWA states that it sees the value in reporting confirmed findings, but if there are no findings the reporting requirement offers no improvement in safety.
We disagree with NWA. We have determined that reporting both positive and negative inspection findings will enable the manufacturer to obtain better insight into the prevalence of the cracking. Reporting all findings will allow the manufacturer to conduct statistical analyses on a continuous basis rather than waiting for the compliance time to expire, which may be several years for certain airplanes. Access to all findings will help the manufacturer to develop final action to address the identified unsafe condition in an expeditious manner. We have made no change to the AD in this regard.

Conclusion

We reviewed the available data, including the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD with the changes described previously. We determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of the AD.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.
We might also have required different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow our FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a note within the AD.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this AD will affect 730 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it will take about 13 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD to the U.S. operators to be $759,200, or $1,040 per product.

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